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REGICIDE

IN DRURY LANE

REGICIDE IN DRURY LANE
WILLIAMI S. MIURRAY

°

In 1800 before the Court of King's Bench an obscure British
soldier named Richard Hadfield stood in the prisoner's dock. It
was charged that the on the preceding fifteenth of May Hadfield
had committed high treason by firing a pistol at George III in
the Drury Lane Theatre, London.
An attempt on the king's life was punishable under the law precisely as if it had been successful. Perhaps there were those on both
sides of the Atlantic who would not have mourned had Hadfield's
aim been better.
Rex v. Hadfield' is a little known classic of the common law.
The defense was insanity. Defense counsel was the Honorable
Thomas Erskine, a giant of the bar who later became Lord Chancellor. 2 His arguments and authorities throw much light upon the
question of sources used 43 years later after the acquittal of
M'Naghten, when the judges of England were asked to answer
a series of involved questions on the subject of criminal responsibility where the sanity of an accused person was in question.
Hadfield was 29 when tried. He had enrolled in the British army
in 1793. In combat in Flanders4 he received a sword blow that all
but beheaded him. A second stroke caused a depressed-type fracture of the skull.
Erskine's approach was especially clever in that his argument
paid profuse lip service to the monarch and then tied it in with
the extreme and valorous patriotism with which the soldier Hadfield
had once served his king in battle.
William S. Murray is a member of the North Dakota Bar and author of articles
in various legal periodicals.

1. 27 How.St.Tr. 1282
2.

The life of Erskine

(1800).
has been

the subject

of an

excellent biographical

study by

Lloyd Paul Stryker, a noted trial attorney in his own right who is most widely known for
his defense of Alger Hiss. See Stryker, For the Defense (1947).
3. Rex v. M'Naghten, 10 Cl. & F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). The extract from
the answers of the judges to the House of Lords most frequently given is that found,
for instance, in 16 C.J. 100: "The jury ought to be told in all cases that every man is
to be presumed to he sane, and to possess a sufficient degree to reason to be responsible
for his crimes, until the contrary be proved to their satisfaction and that to establish a
defense on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved, that at the time of the
committing of the act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason,
from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature or quality of the act he was doing,
or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong." For
the limited and harsh incorporation of the M'Naghten rule into our own Code and
decisions, see N.D. Rev. Code 1 12-0201 (4) (1943); State v. Throndson, 49 N.D. 348,

191 N.W. 28 (1922).
4. At the time of the Napoleonic wars, involved here, Flanders was already one of
Europe's traditional battlefields, as it later became again in World War I.
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If modern lawyers exaggerate at times, they have good precedent,
for so did Erskine.- He told the Court that the first sword slash
had:
"cut across all the nerves which give sensibility and animation
to the body, and his head hung down almost dissevered, until,
by the act of surgery, it was placed in the position you now
see it. But thus, almost destroyed, he (Hadfield) still recollected his duty and continued to maintain the glory of his
country, when a sword divided the membrane of his neck
where it terminates in the head. Yet he still kept his place,
though his helmet had been thrown off by the blow which I
secondly described, when by another sword he was cut into
the very brain."
At this time the reader will sense that particular defense that
crops up after every war-here was a "shell-shocked veteran"
(World War I) or a "psycho war veteran" (World War II).
So much for the factual background as it appears regarding
Hadfield. No doubt he was indeed a good soldier. He had been
personal orderly to the Duke of York in Flanders, as that personage
testified in court. What is of deeper professional interest is the
means with which Erskine outlined the law of insanity as a defense
and applied it to this case.
As if he were foreseeing the future words of the New Hampshire
Supreme Court in 18766 or the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia in more recent times, 7 Eskine said:
"I must convince you, not only that the unhappy prisoner was
a lunatic within my own definition of lunacy, but that the act
in question was the immediate, unqualified offspring of the
disease."
Rejecting the oversimplified rule of knowledge of right and
wrong which we usually associate with the later M'Naghten case,8
he continued thus:
"But it is said that, whatever delusions may overshadow the
mind, every person ought to be responsible for crimes who
has the knowledge of good and evil. I think I canpresently
convince you that there is something too general in this mode
5. The quotations from Erskine's argument found in succeeding portions of the text
are taken from 1 Veeder, Legal Masterpieces (1903). The argument may also be found
set forth in extenso in the original report of the case, supra note 1. Cockburn's arguments
in the M'Naghten case are also extracted from Veeder. The medical authority most cited
by Cockburn, curiously' enough, was an American doctor: A Treatise on the Medical
Jurisprudence of Insanity, 'by I.Ray, M.D. (1st ed. 1838).
6. State v.'Jones," 50 N.H. 369 (1876). See also State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399 (1869).
7. Durham v. .United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. App. 1954). The Durham case, as
is generally known, cites and follows State v. Jones, supra note 6. For a discussion of this
general subject matter as well as the Durham case in particular, see Note, 31 N. Dak. L.
Rev,. 170 (1955).
8. Rex v. M'Naghten, 10 Cl. & F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
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of considering the subject, and you do not, therefore, find any
such proposition in the language of the celebrated writer alluded to by the attorney general in his speech."
Erskine continued along these lines by saying:
"Let us suppose that the character of an insane delusion consisted in the belief that some given person was any brute animal, or an inanimate being (and such cases have existed), and
that, upon the trial of such a lunatic for murder, you firmly,
upon your oaths, were convinced, upon the uncontradicted
evidence of a hundred persons, that he believed the man he
had destroyed to have been a potter's vessel. Suppose it was
quite impossible to doubt that fact, although to all other intents
and purposes he was sane; conversing, reasonipg, and acting
as men not in any manner tainted with insanity converse and
reason and conduct themselves. Let us suppose, further, that
he believed the man whom he destroyed as a potter's vessel,
to be the property of another, and that he had malice against
such supposed person, and that he meant to injure him, knowing the act he was doing to be malicious and injurious, and
that, in short, he had full knowledge of all the principles of
good and evil. Yet would it be possible to convict such a person
of murder if, from the influence of his disease, he was ignorant
of the relation he stood in to the man he had destroyed, and
was utterly unconscious that he had struck at the life of a
human being? I only put this case, and many others might be
brought as examples, to illustrate that the knowledge of good
and evil is too general a description."
The prosecutor, it seems, had cited the precedents of the law
that were ancient even then. He had quoted Coke and Hale for
the proposition that:
"to protect a man from criminal responsibility there must be
a total deprivation of memory and understanding."
Perhaps touching upon the concept, seemingly known even then,
of "irresistible impulse," 9 Erskine said.
"Your province today will therefore be to decide whether the
prisoner, when he did the act, was under the uncontrollable
dominion of insanity, and was impelled to it by a morbid
delusion, or whether it was the act of a man who, though
occasionally mad, or even at the time not perfectly collected,
was yet not actuated by the disease, but by the suggestion of
a wicked and malignant disposition."
When, nearly a half-century later, Daniel M'Naghten shot one
Drummond, secretary to Sir Robert Peel, he was defefided by
9. The argument based on 'irrestible impulse" evidently has never been made to our
own Supreme Court but unquestionably would be treated with the same rejection given
by the Minnesota court in State v. Simenson, 195 Minn. 258, 262 N.W. 638 (1935),

and

State v. Scott, 41 Minn. 365, 43 N.W. 62 (1889). The Scott case is especially good.
The Doctrine is dealt with in authoritative form in the novel "Anatomy of a Murder"
written in 1957 by Mr. Justice Voelker of the Michigan Supreme Court.
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Sir Alexander Cockburn. Cockburn quoted at great length from
the 1800 argument of Erskine in Hadfield's case and obviously
looked upon it as one of his best authorities. His eloquence was
equal to that of his predecessor. For instance, he said:
"The law, then, takes cognizance of that disease which obscures the intellect and poisons the very sources of thought
and feeling in the human being; which deprives man of reason, and converts him into the similtude of the lower animal;
which bears down all the motives which usually stand as barriers around his conduct, and bring him within the operation of
the divine and human law,- leaving the unhappy sufferer to
the wild impulses which his frantic imagination engenders, and
which urge him on with ungovernable fury to the commission of acts which his better reason, when yet unclouded,
would have abhorred. The law, therefore, holds that a human
being in such a state is exempt from legal responsibility and
legal punishment. To hold otherwise would be to violate every
priniciple of justice and humanity. The principle of the English
law, therefore, as a general proposition, admits of no doubt
whatsoever."
The purpose of reproducing this particular argument is to show
that when M'Naghten was tried, as when Hadfield was tried, the
law was settled to a degree often overlooked. The judges of England
did not follow any crude and barbarous "wild beast" doctrine.
But there was a need to state the principles and precedents in a
clear and concise manner. These precedents were not new, but
they needed to be set forth explicitly.
Even more enlightened was the law of Scotland, which Cockburn then proceeded to quote by allusion to the writings of one
Alison:
"The following observations of an eminent writer on the criminal law of Scotland are applicable to the subject: 'Although
a prisoner understands perfectly the distinction between right
and wrong, yet if he labors, as is generally the case, under an
illusion and deception in his own particular case, and is thereby incapable of applying it correctly to his own conduct, he
is in the state of mental aberration which renders him not
criminally answerable for his actions. For example, a mad
person may be perfectly aware that murder is a crime, and
will admit it, if pressed on the subject; still he may conceive
that the homicide he has committed was no wise blamable,
because the deceased had engaged in a conspiracy with others,
against his own life, or was his mortal enemy, who had wounded him in his dearest interests, or was the devil incarnate, whom
it was the duty of every good Christian to meet with weapons
of carnal warfare.'"
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Cockburn then quoted Lord Campbell, who was attorney general
in Oxford's Case,'" as saying then that there was no difference
in that respect between the law of England and Scotland.
He said in further quotation of Scottish authority that Baron
Hume had pointed out:"
"To serve the purpose, therefore, of an excuse in law, the disorder must amount to absolute alienation of reason, 'Ut continua mentis alienatione, omni intellectus careat,'-such a
disease as deprives the patient of the knowledge of the true
disposition of things about him, and of the discernment of
friend from foe, and gives him up to the impulse of his own
distempered fancy, divested of all self-government or control
of his passions. Whether it should be added to the description
that he must have lost all knowledge of good and evil, right
and wrong, is a more delicate question, and fit, perhaps, to be
resolved differently according to the sense in which it is understood. . . . Every judgment in the matter of right and wrong
supposes a case or a state of facts to which it applies ...
Proceeding, as it does, on a false case or conjuration of his own
fancy, his judgment of right and wrong, as to any responsibility
that should attend it, is truly the same as none at all. It is
therefore only in this complete and appropriate sense as relative to the particular thing done, and the situation of the
panel's feelings and consciousness on that occasion, that this
inquiry concerning his intelligence of moral good or evil is
material, and not in any other or larger sense.
These quotations from defense argument at M'Naghten's trial
are given because in order to understand the significance of Hadfield's case it is necessary both to relate it back in time to the
ancient precedents and forward in time to sense its influence on the
M'Naghten case and rule. It also incidentally shows the fallacy of
referring to the M'Naghten doctrine as being one of unelaborated
"right and wrong" as is so often loosely done.
It will be seen that the assassins concerned in these matters were
subject to paranoid delusion, and probably most unhired killers
'of prominent persons fall into this group. Sometimes the victims
are not even prominent. In 1914 a small town Colorado lawyer
was murdered by an outraged client who "believed deceased
while acting as his attorney had betrayed him, financially ruined
12
him, and denounced him to the world as a leper and drunkard."'
The record is silent, and we may only guess, as to Hadfield's
10. Regina v. Oxford, 9 Car. & P. 525, 173 Eng. Rep. 941 (1840) (assassination
attempt on Queen Victoria; verdict, not guilty of high treason by reason of insanity).
11. 1 Hume, Commentaries on the Law of Scotland 37.
12. Ryan v. People, 60 Colo. 425, 153 Pac. 756 (1916). The Colorado court, after
aiming telling blows at the N'Naghten rule, rejected it.
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own grievance against the king. He had been consorting, we know,
with a full-fledged lunatic who was possessed of fanatical delusions directed against the Deity and the Christian religion.
After examining a few witnesses for the defense, Chief Justice
Kenyon stopped the trial, being convinced that a clear case of
13
insanity had been established.
Hadfield did not go free. Like Durham" he was consigned to
an institution which we now would call a mental hospital, being
sent to Bedlam." 5 As we know, this was no pleasant fate. There
he lingered on for years, never free, it was said, of delusion. At
length he died in the obscurity from which he had come.
George III lived on until 1820. He was not one of the English
monarchs who contributed greatly to the history, legal or otherwise,
of his country. Yet this case, involving his intended demise, is one
worthy of attention by those who are interested in the roots of our
judicial history.Ie

13. Contrary to what we often suppose, British procedure often allowed, and still
allows, more flexibility and directness in disposing of matters procedurally than does Code
practice.
14. See note 7, supra.
15. "A corruption of Bethlehem. The hospital of St. Mary of Bethlehem in London.
Originally a priory, founded about 1247, but used from 1400 as an asylum for the
insane." Black's Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1951).
16. Two interesting bypaths on the law of criminal responsibility are crimes committed
while asleep (Somnambulism) and under the influence of hypnotism. The rare instance
of somnambulism is treated in the Kentucky case of Fain v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 183
(1879). A court in Copenhagen, Denmark, about 1946, convicted as a principal a
hypnotist, for crimes committed by a hypnotic subject. Unfortunately, the citation is not
available.
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